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1 Introduction 
This paper provides an overview of recent studies on the formation and stability of 
International Environmental Agreements (IEAs). We do not attempt, however, to survey this 
rapidly growing field in its entirety but rather concentrate on its political economy. Hence, we 
give an overview of the development and current theoretical modelling approaches and of 
empirical investigations into the political processes that drive the formation of IEAs and their 
design. Of the large literature that has emerged in the domain of public choice on the one 
hand and in the domain of IEAs on the other hand we attempt to survey what falls in the 
intersection of the two.  
Efficient environmental mitigation policies for transboundary pollutants require international 
coordination and cooperation because of international spillovers (e.g. Ostrom 1990). 
Whereas we can usually assume that governments can design and enforce environmental 
policies at the national level, there is no supranational body that can take the role of a 
government at the international level. Property rights, i.e. emission rights for transboundary 
pollutants and resources, are usually not well-defined, let alone enforced. The role of IEAs is 
to define property rights and to overcome an environmental anarchy (Buchanan 1975, 
Weikard 2011). In much of the remainder, for ease of presentation of ideas, we will focus on 
the case of climate policies where greenhouse gas mitigation is a global public good. But 
international environmental agreements deal with many different issues like pollution and 
resource use and may refer to local, regional or global scales.  
Different studies analyse directly the negotiation process and the outcome related to IEA 
formation (e.g. Young 1994, Miles et al. 2002, Barrett 2003 and Mitchell 2009). 
Environmental economic policy analysis offers important recommendations on the design of 
efficient and effective environmental policies. But frequently the models used as tools for 
analysis conceive governments as benevolent social planners whose goal is to increase the 
welfare of their citizens. Public choice scholars, however, have challenged this assumption 
as being too restrictive (e.g. Persson and Tabellini 2000; Oates and Portney 2001, Mueller 
2003).  
Our view is that political economy complements environmental economics with an analysis of 
the political process. Thus, political economy considers a governments’ actions not as mainly 
driven by welfare maximising objectives but rather assumes that political agents are 
susceptible to being influenced by other agents, for instance through a desire of the 
government to increase its prestige, to enhance its possibilities of being re-elected or to 
increase its budget (Schumpeter 1942, Buchanan and Tullock 1962, Persson and Tabellini 
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2000). Therefore, governments can be seen to be influenced by voters and lobby groups 
where the media may play an important role. Political economy models can be interpreted as 
extensions of conventional economic models of collective decision making. For our purpose 
we adopt a broad definition as proposed by Oates and Portney (2003) who define “political 
economy” as: 
“the study of the collective or political processes through which public economic 
decisions are made” (Oates and Portney 2003, p. 327). 
For the case of IEAs this definition suggests an analysis of the goals and constraints of 
governments at the international negotiation tables (Persson and Tabellini 2000, Mueller 
2003). The position of governments is usually influenced by domestic political negotiations 
leading to results that differ from the welfare maximising policy, even from the perspective of 
an individual country. International negotiations are shaped by governments who interact 
with other political agents such as political pressure groups (lobbies) and the electorate or by 
intragovernmental processes such as competition between ministries. These aspects are 
important for the design of IEAs as international policies are confronted with different 
feasibility constraints at the national level.  
Modelling political processes may help to explain why policy recommendations aiming at 
efficiency differ frequently from what is actually implemented. Furthermore, it may help to 
anticipate the acceptability of policy proposals and it may contribute to improvements of 
constitutional designs such that inefficiencies can be mitigated. Frey (1992), Kirchgässner 
and Schneider (2003) and Kollmann and Schneider (2010) distinguish four different types of 
agents relevant for shaping the process of policy-making: (1) voters, (2) politicians, (3) public 
bureaucrats, and (4) agents related to industries (e.g. capital owners, managers and 
employees).  
Many studies of the political economy of environmental policy-making are devoted to 
national environmental policies; early contributions are Buchanan and Tullock (1975) and 
Becker (1983). However, only few studies have explored the political economy of the 
formation of IEAs. For instance, Michaelowa and Greiner (1996), Carraro and Siniscalco 
(1998), Michaelowa (1998), Congleton (2001), Vogt (2002), and Böhringer and Vogt (2004) 
focus on political processes within a country. The studies by Haffoudhi (2005a and 2005b), 
Buchholz et al. (2005), Altamirano-Cabrera et al. (2007) and Roelfsma (2007) explore 
political economy approaches to IEA design and stability.  
We divide our survey into three main parts: (i) theory (Section 2), (ii) empirical studies 
including experiments (Section 3), and (iii) implications for future research (Section 4).  
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2 Theoretical model approaches 
With few exceptions, the literature on IEA formation considers monolithic governments that 
represent the interests of their nation in international negotiations (e.g. Hoel 1992, Carraro 
and Siniscalco 1993, Barrett 1997, Caparrós et al. 2004). Even though this approach has 
yielded many important insights, it ignores the fact that governments often have interests not 
in line with those of their domestic constituents. Moreover, they do not consider that the 
incentives embodied in elections and other political control systems may ultimately determine 
what these governments can and will decide at the international negotiation tables. Political 
scientists and public choice scholars have long advocated these ideas. In a representative 
democracy, national political actors influence policy decisions of their representatives – 
including positions taken in international negotiations. 
Barrett (1998) distinguishes five different stages of international environmental treaty-
making. These are: (1) pre-negotiations, (2) negotiations, (3) ratification, (4) implementation 
and (5) renegotiations. Ideally a political economy model of IEA formation has to cover the 
particularities of all five stages. For the ultimate success of an IEA, however, stage 4 is of 
major importance. This stage is crucial for the effectiveness of a treaty as industries and 
consumers must finally change their behaviour. However, the economic literature of IEA 
formation focuses in particular on stages 2 and 3.  
Before we discuss stages 2 and 3 in more detail, we summarise recent models of minimum 
participation rules (MPRs). MPRs can be understood as the rules that determine the 
conditions under which a treaty becomes binding. These rules will impact the negotiations 
and can be located at the pre-negotiation stage.  
Most IEAs employ MPRs that usually define a minimum number of countries that need to 
participate in an agreement. The standard approach analyses MPRs assuming homogenous 
countries and complete information (e.g. Rutz 2001, Rubio and Casino 2005, Courtois and 
Haeringer 2005, Carraro et al. 2009). The result is a stable grand coalition (participation of 
all countries). Weikard et al. (2009) study the impact of an MPR for the case of 
heterogeneous countries. Following Carraro et al. (2009) they consider an endogenous 
choice of the MPR. They find that an MPR will always be implemented. The efficient 
outcome requires participation of all countries. However, countries with sufficient bargaining 
power will be able to maintain a free-rider position and the grand coalition will not emerge. 
Black et al. (1993) consider uncertainty about coalition formation in a model with identical 
countries. Their model explains that it may be suboptimal to require participation of all 
countries. Harstad (2006) assumes heterogeneous countries as well as uncertainty about 
costs and benefits of the public good. The initial decision on the MPR is endogenised and 
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identified by majority voting. As the voting game may not have a Condorcet winner, a stable 
equilibrium MPR might not evolve endogenously.  
We now turn to stages 2 and 3 that are closely linked. At the latter stage, ratification, 
national governments have to deal with multiple interests (Putnam 1988). National 
governments can only agree on those treaties that are likely to be ratified at national levels. 
There are two constraints: First, government’s proposal at international negotiations should 
be acceptable to its domestic constituents because this, at the end, will help to win elections 
(Morrow 1991). Second, political pressure groups (or lobbies), such as business 
associations and environmental NGOs, are capable of affecting the behaviour of politicians 
by providing information, by financing election campaigns, or by bringing environmental 
concerns into the voters’ minds (Grossman and Helpman 2001). These political factors play 
an important role when the national representatives meet at the international level to 
negotiate mitigation levels and policies, for instance. In the remainder of this section we 
explore both mechanisms of policy-making. 
2.1 Strategic delegation 
One way of extending (environmental) economic models in order to include elements of the 
political process is the use of median voter models.1 The underlying assumption is that the 
majority winning political proposal coincides with the median voter’s preferences (Black 
1948, Downs 1957). The median voter theorem is applied in many political economy models 
but builds on rather restrictive assumptions like unimodal preferences and a one-dimensional 
policy space. Still the median voter theorem may be useful to understand the potential 
impact of voters’ strategic behaviour on a country’s position in international negotiations. In a 
strategic delegation model of IEA formation voters delegate their decision power to 
representatives at the international negotiation tables. The representatives, usually the 
government, then negotiate the terms and conditions of an international agreement. Given 
the free-rider incentives in transboundary pollution games one would expect that strategic 
voting exacerbates the problem. However, the impact of strategic delegation on IEA 
formation has not been fully explored yet.  
The strategic delegation model generally used to analyse international policy-making is a 
two-stage game. At the first stage voters (using majority rule) elect their preferred politician 
who, at the second stage, will negotiate the international treaty. In the usual two-country 
setting voters take the result of the foreign election as given and then select the candidate 
                                                 
1 For a discussion of the median voter theorem cf. Mueller (2003, Chapter 11). 
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that represents the most favourable position in the subsequent policy game. A key result 
from this approach is that voters may elect a politician with different preferences than their 
own; the outcome deviates from the median voter’s true preferences. In essence the median 
voter strategically misrepresents his own preferences because this gives an advantage at 
the international policy negotiations (see Persson and Tabellini 2000, Chapter 12). The 
strategic delegation approach has mainly been applied to economic phenomena such as 
international tax policies and the provision of transboundary public goods. (e.g. Persson and 
Tabellini 1992, Dolado et al. 1994, Segendorff 1998, Böhringer and Vogt 2004, Buchholz et 
al. 2005, Roelfsma 2007,  Kempf and Rosignol 2010).  
Persson and Tabellini (1992) analyse a two-country, two-period model to study the effect of 
strategic delegation on capital taxation, considering that capital may become more mobile 
(e.g. as with the European Union integration). In their model the population in each country 
elects a government (through majority voting) that sets a tax policy taking the tax policy of 
the other country as given. Persson and Tabellini show that voters may find it optimal to 
elect a government that is less sensitive to the prospects of the tax policy because this 
offsets the economic consequences of higher capital mobility on the tax rate. 
Dolado et al. (1994) study strategic delegation in an international monetary policy game. 
Their analysis focuses on the incentives that governments have to delegate the control of 
monetary policy to independent central bankers. They find that governments choose more 
conservative central bankers (with respect to the output/inflation ratio) than their own 
preferences as a means to commit to a more restrictive monetary policy.  
Segendorff (1998) looks at the effect of strategic delegation on the bargaining process 
between two countries for the provision of a transboundary public good. Countries are 
assumed to produce two goods, one private and one public good that is shared between the 
two nations. The ideal allocation of both goods is a function of the preferences of the 
citizens. In each country, the principal may delegate the task of the negotiations to a citizen 
that is appointed as agent. Although, the analysis of Segendorff does not consider an 
electoral process, the principal may be thought of as the decisive (median) voter and the 
agent as the government. Delegation is a two-stage game where at the first stage principals 
simultaneously choose agents and at the second stage the agents bargain over the global 
provision of the public good. The bargaining is solved applying the Nash bargaining solution 
where the threat point is given by the reservation utilities of the agents. Segendorff finds that 
principals will choose agents that have stronger preferences for the private good than their 
own because this lowers the reservation utility and thus weakens the bargaining position of 
the other agent. 
Jena Economic Research Papers 2011 - 038
  
 
7
Böhringer and Vogt (2004) study a model where the median voter places a restriction on the 
costs of climate policies that would be incurred by a government upon joining an IEA. Hence, 
the willingness to pay (WTP) for the mitigation of the median voter determines the outcome 
of negotiations. Böhringer and Vogt apply their model to study the ratification of the Kyoto 
Protocol. They calculate costs with a computable general equilibrium model, whereas the 
WTP is calculated from survey data. Böhringer and Vogt argue that a focus on costs is 
warranted because benefits from climate protection can be considered negligible for the 
current generation. Comparing mitigation costs required to meet Kyoto targets and the 
median voter’s WTP sheds light on the incentives to ratify. They find that the gap between 
cost and actual WTP is wide particularly for the USA, which may explain the USA’s 
withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol. 
Buchholz et al. (2005) study the effect of strategic delegation on IEAs. The underlying game 
is a three-stage game. At the first stage citizens elect politicians, i.e. the median voter elects 
his preferred candidate. At the second stage elected politicians negotiate over the level of 
economic activity and transfers (using the Nash bargaining solution). If an agreement is 
reached, it becomes binding. Otherwise countries adopt a non-cooperative policy, i.e. a 
Nash equilibrium that constitutes the threat point for the bargaining stage. The model 
comprises two symmetric countries that produce a domestic good and a transboundary 
environmental damage. Buchholz et al. (2005) show that in the equilibrium the median voter 
in each country chooses a government that cares less about the environmental problem than 
he does, because this improves the strategic position of the government at the bargaining 
stage. This holds irrespective of whether or not countries participate in an IEA. However, if 
countries sign an agreement, voters will elect governments that are less environmentally 
concerned than the governments elected when countries are non-signatories. Hence, 
strategic voting undermines the success of IEAs in tackling the environmental problem and 
the outcome does not reflect the median voters’ true preferences for environmental quality.  
Roelfsma (2007) analyses the effects of strategic voting on non-cooperative environmental 
policy-making for the case of two symmetric countries. He finds that elected politicians are 
either more or less concerned about the environment than the median voter. Countries will 
engage in a ‘race to the bottom’ or a ‘race to the top’ depending on the strength of the 
environmental preferences of the median voter. 
Kempf and Rosignol (2010) focus on the provision of a transboundary public good through 
the negotiation of an international agreement. They analyse a model where the public good 
is financed by contributions from two neighbouring countries. The good is funded by taxes 
that are collected at the national level. The study focuses on two tax regimes: (i) an equal tax 
rate in both countries and (ii) tax rates that equalize gains. The political process is modelled 
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as a two-stage game, where at the first stage voters elect their delegate for the international 
negotiations and, at the second stage, both delegates meet and may or may not agree on 
the means for providing the good. Kempf and Rossignol find that both countries have an 
incentive to strategically delegate their representatives and that an agreement, if it is 
reached, involves higher taxes in both countries compared to the case without agreement. 
Furthermore, it will be impossible to reach an agreement if the public good is financed by a 
tax with an equal rate in both countries when incomes are sufficiently different. In that case 
the poorer country would prefer a higher and the richer country a lower tax rate. Any possible 
compromise would be rejected by one of the delegates. 
2.2 Lobby groups 
Olson (1965) extensively described lobbying activities in his seminal contribution on “the 
logic of collective action”. In a representative democracy political decision-making is not 
solely influenced by the concerns of the general electorate. Government decisions may be 
influenced by lobbies’ pressure and political outcomes may differ from the median voters’ 
preferences. Olson notes that interest groups are confronted with free-rider problems. This 
limits the capability to organise common interests which is essential to influence decision-
making. However, if interest groups are able to overcome this problem (e.g. by offering 
excludable services to members), then they can influence political decisions. Political 
economy studies dealing with lobby groups in policy-making may be classified in two 
categories depending on the motives of lobby groups: the electoral motive approach and the 
influence motive approach (Grossman and Helpman 1994, 1996). The first argues that 
lobbies wish to promote the candidate that reflects their preferences on a policy issue before 
upcoming elections. The second argues that lobbies aim to influence the policy choice of an 
incumbent politician.  
According to the influence motive approach, an incumbent government maximizes its 
political support function by implementing a certain policy. The political support function 
usually includes contributions by lobbies and social welfare. The analysis abstracts from 
details of the electoral process, but contributions can be thought of as a means to influence 
voters. Thus, contributions do not need to be monetary but may also relate to, for instance, 
media pressure.   Grossman and Helpman (1994, 1996 and 2001) assume that competing 
lobby groups offer contributions to a government. The contributions are conditional on the 
policy implemented and aim at avoiding the costs related to environmental regulations in the 
case of industry lobbies. Environmental lobbies would contribute in order to induce higher 
environmental standards (Hillman and Ursprung 1994). In the international domain 
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governments would take a particular position in IEA negotiations in return for contributions. 
This will usually result in policies that deviate from the welfare maximizing policies as well as 
from the median voters’ preferred policy.  
Fredriksson (1997), Aidt (1998), Conconi (2003) and Fredriksson et al. (2005) have further 
developed the political contributions approach in the domain of environmental policy-making. 
Fredriksson (1997) studies the influence of lobby groups on environmental tax policy and 
shows that there is a relation between the strength of lobby activities and the deviation from 
an optimal pollution tax. Aidt (1998) analyses the effect of environmentalist and industry 
lobbies on environmental policy in the presence of production externalities. Aidt shows that 
lobby groups, through the competitive political process, are important to internalize 
production externalities. Conconi (2003) analyses the effect of environmentalist lobbies on 
the determination of trade and environmental policies for large countries linked by trade and 
transboundary pollution problems. Conconi’s results show that the impact of lobby groups on 
environmental policy depends on the trade policy regime, the type of decision-making 
process (if it is unilateral or cooperative) and the size of the transboundary environmental 
spillovers. Although there is a large literature on lobby groups and international policy-
making, the analysis of the potential effects of lobbying on the formation and stability of IEAs 
has not been examined in detail – with the exception of Haffoudhi (2005a) and Altamirano-
Cabrera et al. (2007). Haffoudhi studies the impact of lobby groups on the size and stability 
of IEAs. She finds that, for homogeneous countries, a global agreement would be sustained 
by means of industry lobby contributions. The result mentioned relies on a joint maximization 
of the political revenues of all signatory countries. This seems to be a rather strong 
assumption. Therefore, Altamirano-Cabrera et al. (2007) study the same problem using the 
canonical model, introduced by Hoel (1992), Carraro and Siniscalco (1993) and Barrett 
(1994) where countries first decide whether or not to join an IEA and then set their emission 
levels such that IEA members act jointly and maximize joint payoffs while the remaining 
singletons maximize their own payoffs. Altamirano-Cabrera et al. (2007) assume that 
signatories commit to reduce externalities to other signatories but do not benefit from foreign 
lobby contributions. Their finding is that signatory governments will usually accept 
contributions from the environmentalist lobby. Only partial coalitions emerge and the grand 
coalition is generally unstable. 
2.4 External constraints and the “dirty work hypothesis” 
Closely related to the lobby problem is the so-called “dirty work hypothesis” (Vaubel 1986, p. 
48). This hypothesis has been applied to explain delegation of power to higher levels of 
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decision-making e.g. in case of the International Monetary Fund (James 1998, Mussa and 
Savastano 1999, Dreher and Jensen 2007, Dreher 2009, Dreher et al. 2009). Its logic can 
further be applied to central bank independence. If the European Council could influence 
monetary policy directly, each government would prefer to adopt a lax monetary policy that is 
in line with its median voter’s preferences (e.g. Freytag 2007). The same line of argument 
can shed light on IEA formation. In case of international environmental problems 
governments have an incentive to implement policies that allow distributing the costs that 
particular interest groups would face to the general public, i.e. the voters. If, in addition, 
information costs (about the policy measure) increase with a higher degree of centralisation, 
knowledge gets more and more exclusive to organised interest groups. The loss in 
transparency allows politicians to support particular interests without facing an adequate 
opposition by less organised voters. This strategy pays off for the government as long as the 
support of particular interest groups is in line with the maximisation of votes. Decentralized 
policies (if applicable) offer a possible solution for the problem described. 
 
3 International environmental cooperation: empirical and experimental studies 
In what follows we provide a brief overview of empirical findings about international 
environmental policy coordination and cooperation. The survey of empirical work in this 
domain is complemented by a summary of recent experimental studies that explore the 
behavioural responses to problems of institutional choice. 
3.1 Determinants of IEA formation 
Several studies examine the impacts of democracy  to identify what drives individual 
countries to sign an IEA. . There is support for the hypothesis that democracy has a positive 
impact on signing an IEA. An early contribution is Congleton (1992) where the results  show 
that total emissions are larger under democracy. However, the output of methane per unit of 
GDP is significantly less compared to non-democratic regimes. Results obtained by Murdoch 
and Sandler (1997) as well as Murdoch et al. (1997) support the view that more political 
freedom is positively correlated with emission reduction. Gleditsch and Sverdrup (1996) use 
bivariate regressions and find that the ratification of IEAs as well as the presence of 
environmental organisations within a country positively affects national environmental policy-
making. Neumayer (2002a) finds evidence that democracies are participating more 
frequently in IEAs. Fredriksson et al. (2005) study the effect of environmentalist lobby groups 
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and the degree of democracy on environmental policy-making. Their analysis for OECD 
countries shows an effect of lobby activities on policy-making. However, this effect is more 
likely to occur in countries with sufficiently high levels of political competition. Fredriksson 
and Wollscheid (2007) are able to show that the generally  positive correlation between 
environmental performance and democracy is mainly due to the use of parliamentary 
systems. By contrast, in many cases, presidential congressional systems perform similar to 
autocracies. Fredriksson and Wollscheid relate this result to the fact that parliamentary 
democracies have a lower degree of separation of powers on the one hand and a higher 
degree of legislative cohesion on the other hand. 
Beside democracy there are additional determinants of the success of IEAs. There is a 
positive correlation between trade openness and signing an IEA (Neumayer 2002b). Roberts 
et al. (2004) look at different parameters influencing IEA participation. Their empirical results 
identify three important variables with a significant positive impact: first, the narrowness of 
the export base, second, voice and accountability of citizens through their domestic 
institutions and third, the role of NGOs.  
Frederiksson et al. (2007) focus on the impact of environmental lobbying on signing the 
Kyoto Protocol. Environmental lobbying is measured by the number of organised 
environmentalists within a country. They find a positive correlation between environment 
related interest groups and the probability that countries sign an IEA. A second finding is a 
positive correlation of IEA membership and corruption. This rather surprising result mainly 
refers to the particular incentives of developing countries to sign an IEA. It suggests that 
monetary transfers to environmental interest groups within developing countries (e.g. by 
international organisations) are more effective under corrupt regimes as interest groups can 
more easily shape political decisions in favour of their own interests. Von Stein (2008) 
studies the stringency of policies for the Kyoto agreement. The results suggest that flexible 
mechanisms can facilitate treaty implementation. The study further supports the hypothesis 
that NGOs are important for successful implementation of IEAs. Almer and Winkler (2010) 
look at the Kyoto protocol and find that countries that expect high damages from climate 
change are more likely to sign an IEA whereas a negative correlation is found for countries 
with high compliance costs. At the ratification stage there is empirical evidence of strategic 
interaction. Perrin and Bernauer (2010) explicitly look at the ratification stage of IEA 
formation. They use a multivariate econometric model based on likelihood estimation. The 
model allows treating separately endogenous and exogenous factors influencing a country’s 
decision about treatment ratification. They find that exogenous factors like country size, 
geographical distance and a foreign country’s level of GDP positively affect the national 
decision to sign an IEA. A negative correlation is found when foreign countries are seen as 
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competitors. Regarding the endogenous (country specific) factors a positive effect is 
reported for trade openness and a negative affect for pollution share and population size. No 
significant result is reported for the national per capita GDP.  
Another interesting question refers to the preferences and motives of climate policy-makers. 
Freytag and Wangler (2008) find a link between free-riding on the ratification of the Kyoto 
Protocol and export expectations. They argue that free-riding of some industrialised 
countries may generate positive export expectations in non-free-riding countries. They focus 
on the German case and find evidence that export expectations for green technologies 
(proxied by patent counts) are positively correlated with the diffusion of green technologies 
at the national level. This might explain the observed heterogeneity among industrialised 
countries with respect to the stringency of climate change policies.  
Lange et al. (2007) study environmental policy makers’ preferences for equity. Their findings 
suggest that equity plays a more important role for representatives of developing countries. 
Thus, policy-makers from developing countries support the view that environmental 
regulation should be dependent on the level of development implying higher abatement 
levels for more developed countries. They also find a difference with respect to the 
preferences concerning environmental regulation of industries as representatives from richer 
countries disapprove more often the allocation of the costs to the polluter. Interestingly, 
representatives of developed countries who are in office for a long time are more in favour of 
allocating pollution permits according to population shares among countries. Thus, it seems 
that representatives of developed countries become more concerned about equity over time 
while and if they remain in office. However, the overall results suggest that the regional 
differences of the equity concerns depend on the level of development.  
3.2 Experimental literature on cooperation and IEA formation  
In recent years experimental research methods have been applied to improve the 
understanding of environmental problems (e.g. Milinski et al. 2008). A few experiments have 
been designed in order to provide insights in strategic interaction related to IEA formation. 
Moxnes and van der Heijden (2003) study the role of leadership in a so-called “public bad” 
experiment. In this experiment, two investment options are given. One consists of an 
investment generating negative externalities to group members and the other consists of an 
investment without externalities. The payoff structure is chosen such that it is a dominant 
strategy under selfish behaviour to invest the entire endowment into the choice option with 
externalities. Compared to a treatment without leadership, contributions to the public bad (in 
the leader-follower setting) are less if leaders start their investment with a positive 
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investment signal. However, the gains that are related to the leading position (lower 
externality costs) are not enough to compensate leaders for their costs of deviating from 
their dominant strategy. An important role of leadership is also reported by Sturm and 
Weimann (2008).  
Strategic interaction at the ratification stage is part of the analysis by McEvoy (2010). He 
finds, different from the theoretical predictions, that free-riders (at the coalition formation 
stage) are not the first who opt out of the coalition. Most players wait and decide at the end 
of a pre-defined time period not to become a coalition member. McEvoy et al. (2011) look at 
the compliance and enforcement problem to contribute to a public good. They do not find 
support for their main hypothesis that member-financed enforcement to maintain compliance 
within a stable coalition results in greater participation and higher public good provision. 
Dannenberg, Sturm and Vogt (2010) study unilateral preferences on equity. They ran an 
online experiment with subjects who had been involved in climate change negotiations. The 
underlying game was set up in order to test equity preferences based on Fehr and Schmidt 
(1999). One of the findings is that subjects have a significant aversion against advantageous 
inequality (one dislikes being relatively better off than others) whereas the aversion against 
disadvantageous inequality (one dislikes being relatively worse off than others) is only 
moderate. In contrast to other empirical findings (e.g. Lange et al. 2007) Dannenberg, Sturm 
and Vogt (2010) do not find significant regional differences in equity aversion. One 
explanation for the difference of the empirical findings and the experimental results might be 
that national interests (a country’s position at the IEA formation stage) outweigh individual 
equity concerns. 
Cherry and Dickinson (2008) examine the role of choice options to contribute to a public 
good. They find that voluntary contributions to the public good increase if there are more 
options available. This suggests that IEAs need to offer different ways to contribute to the 
public good. Freytag et al. (2010) report results of a threshold public goods game over six 
rounds with exogenous milestones and punishment. Milestones are meant to represent 
international policies, e.g. international environmental agreements. They find that milestones 
have a significant effect in those cases where the public good implies the conservation of a 
status quo, such as, for instance, a given level of environmental quality.  
Recent experimental work of Dannenberg, Lange and Sturm (2010) and McGinty et al. 
(2011) directly targets individual group formation behaviour for the provision of a public 
good. Both studies are motivated by games of IEA formation. In the experiments participants 
were playing two-stage games where they announce their willingness to join at the first stage 
and play a public goods game at the second stage. In the study of Dannenberg et al. agents 
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have identical payoff functions. In the control treatment no coalition could be formed. 
Comparing coalition formation to the control treatment small and insignificant increases in 
the overall provision of the public good were observed. McGinty et al. (2011) consider 
experiments where payoffs differ across agents. They introduce this heterogeneity in order 
to test the impact of different transfer schemes among coalition members. They find that a 
well-designed transfer scheme that distributes the coalition payoff proportionally to outside 
options enhances membership and average contributions significantly.  
4 Knowledge gaps and implications for research  
In this survey, we have identified some gaps in the study of the political economy of IEA 
formation. These gaps define needs for future research. Generally, as it is obvious from a 
comparison of sections 2 and 3, the basic theoretical framework for the study of IEAs is 
largely unrelated to the empirical approaches. This observation does not extend, however, to 
experimental studies. The reasons are probably threefold. (i) The standard two-stage game 
of IEA formation offers a “traditional” view with countries as players but no room for political 
processes. Extensions of this model are possible but very rare so far. (ii) Empirical studies 
offer interesting findings but little insight into the mechanisms that drive policy outcomes. (iii) 
Finally, it is notoriously difficult to test “a theory of international environmental agreements” –
even if it existed– due to a lack of data that are comparable across different kinds of 
agreements.  
More specifically we wish to highlight four areas for promising research. First, for the case of 
strategic voting there is a need to build convincing voting models that better reflect the “real” 
aspects of the political process. For instance, most models consider simultaneous voting in 
different countries that precedes international policy-making and the analysis is restricted to 
just two countries. Games that offer a convincing sequential structure are yet to be 
developed.  
Second, ratification of IEAs could be modelled as sequential games where at each moment 
each parliament/government may decide whether to ratify or to wait. Such a model set up 
would allow for a role of lobby groups after the negotiations when the main commitments are 
already drafted. The ultimate “fate” of the IEA is, thus, subject to a different type of pressure 
given the particular decision-making process of a parliament or congress and the way in 
which lobby groups can influence it.  
Third, on the empirical side, a better match of concepts and data will be one way forward. 
For instance, some empirical analyses of lobbying rely on data describing corruption (see, 
for instance, Fredriksson et al. 2007). Although in some cases there may be a positive 
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relation between corruption and lobbying, this cannot be generalised. After all, while 
corruption is illegal, most lobbying activities are legal. For European countries, for instance, 
that are generally characterised by low levels of corruption but powerful lobbies, a corruption 
indicator will fail as an appropriate indicator of pressure on governments at the international 
negotiation tables.  
Finally, from the perspective of political relevance, it seems promising to further study the 
role of institutions for the stability and success of IEAs (e.g. MPRs, definition of emission and 
resource rights, allocation mechanisms etc.). Furthermore, technological and structural 
change towards more environmentally friendly production processes impact and are 
impacted by IEAs (Nagashima and Dellink 2008), Nagashima et al. 2011). Hence, the 
political economy of industrial policies is also linked to IEA formation. In section 3.1 we 
report that transition towards democracy and trade openness has been found to be 
important. This shows that the analysis of IEAs may also be addressed from a comparative 
systems point of view.  
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